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James Ferguson*
Organised Australian labour ¢rst demonstrated its power in the shearing industry
just over 100 years ago. The system of arbitration developed over the last century
continues to have a profound impact on agriculture. This article pro¢les the
Australian rural labour market and identi¢es some continuing regulatory
impediments to the proper functioning of the rural labour market. A brief review
of the links between agriculture and other industries in Australia concludes that
the greatest improvement in farm pro¢tability from a better functioning labour
market is to be had from productivity increases in industries outside the farm
gate.
1. Introduction
This article provides a pro¢le of the Australian rural labour market and
summarises some aspects of the historical interaction between the industry
and labour market regulation. After identifying some continuing regulatory
impediments to the proper functioning of the rural labour market, a
comparison is made between agriculture and other industries.
A brief review of research on the links between agriculture and other
industries in Australia leads to the conclusion that the greatest improvement
in farm pro¢tability from a better functioning labour market is to be had
from productivity increases in industries outside the farm gate. The meat
processing industry and the waterfront provide useful examples, and an
attempt is made to quantify the gains to agriculture from labour market
reform in those industries.
2. The agricultural workforce
Australian agriculture engages about 409000 people, about 5 per cent of the
total workforce, producing about 21 per cent of Australia's export income.
Approximately half this number are employees, with the balance being
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK or 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 42:3, pp. 321-332
*James Ferguson is at the National Farmers Federation, Barton, ACT.self-employed and unpaid family labour. In 1993^94, family labour
constituted 75 per cent of the total value of labour on broadacre family
farms.
The composition of the workforce and institutional framework within
which it must operate are obviously important to the pro¢tability of
businesses in the sector. Nonetheless, the negative in£uences of the insti-
tutional framework have been neutralised to some extent by management
practices within the farm sector for the rural work force and farm
pro¢tability is more readily in£uenced by industrial relations reform
upstream and downstream from the farm gate.
3. Links
Although agriculture accounts for less than 5 per cent of GDP (1995/96),
this understates the importance of the sector to the economy. Tamblyn and
Powell (1985) show that forward links make agriculture essential to 32 per
cent of employment in the rest of the economy. This indirect employment
means that ine¤ciencies in the labour market outside the farm gate impact
adversely on the pro¢tability of the farm sector.
This conclusion is hardly surprising given that a large proportion of the
manufacturing industry is engaged in the processing of farm products into
food and ¢bre products. This sector has an annual output of A$30 billion from
about 3500 businesses across Australia.
1 The farm sector is amongst the most
productive and internationally competitive sectors of the economy. EPAC
estimates that productivity levels in Australian agriculture are about 20 per
cent above comparable industries in OECD countries whereas, for the
Australian business sector as a whole, productivity levels are about 10 per cent
below average OECD levels. Some of these poorer performing sectors have a
signi¢cant e¡ect on farm pro¢tability. For example, Stoekel estimates that a
10 per cent productivity increase in beef processing would have a 16-fold
larger e¡ect on farm pro¢tability than a comparable increase in on-farm
pro¢tability.
4. The meat industry
The meat industry is perhaps the best example of how our current system
of labour market regulation has caused economic and social loss, particularly
to the farm sector. A series of studies over the last decade have revealed that
our meat processing sector is about half as e¤cient as our competitors in
the United States and New Zealand. Given that most Australian meat is sold
1See Ritchie (1998).
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ine¤ciency? The answer: pay half as much for livestock as our competitors.
The intriguing fact is that the rate of pay for meat workers does not
explain why we are twice as expensive at processing than our competitors.
The average meat worker in Australia costs about 20 per cent more than the
equivalent US worker. How, then, does this translate into double the cost
of processing?
Perhaps this is best explained by describing brie£y the infamous `tally
system'. Under this arrangement, meat workers are paid a set amount for
processing up to a certain number of carcases per day, known as `minimum
tally'. For each additional carcase processed a certain amount is earned until
`maximum tally' is reached and from then on each carcase is paid for at time
and a half, and then double time.
The meat industry is a low margin, high turnover business. Labour costs
account for about 65 per cent of abattoir operating expenses. When maximum
tally is reached and penalty rates are payable, most abattoirs must shut down
because it is simply unpro¢table to operate. As a consequence, the average
Australian abattoir operates only 36 hours per week. This means that we have
an over-investment in abattoirs which are grossly under-utilised.
The crucial problem with the tally is that it not only ¢xes the rate of pay, it
also ¢xes the rate of productivity. An employer who was able to introduce new
technology that allowed a ¢xed number of animals to be processed in half the
time would ¢nd that his workforce would leave the premises in half the time.
That is how the productivity gains would be distributed if the employer was
obliged to adhere to the award. Clearly, this is a grossly ine¤cient form of
distribution. The employer in such a predicament has no incentive to introduce
new technology, nor have the workers because their income would not rise.
It should be no surprise, then, to learn that meat workers are in fact a
relatively poorly paid section of our workforce. In large part this is due to
the awards under which they work. Of course, the major loser is the livestock
producer. Australian abattoirs cannot in£uence the world price for meat.
They cannot in£uence the world price for capital. The Industrial Relations
Commission ¢xes the price of labour and its productivity. If they want to
make a pro¢t, they must calculate these costs and then calculate the
remainder left with which to pay for the livestock. As long as most of their
competitors face the same ¢xed prices for labour and capital, abattoirs can
simply pass on the ine¤ciencies to the producer in the form of lower
livestock prices, in the case of beef, paying 57 per cent of the US farm gate
price for an equivalent animal.
2
2Palmer (1996).
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the projected gains from a modest 4 per cent improvement in meat
processing productivity based on the Australia Meat Holdings Enterprise
Flexibility Agreement. These are summarised in table 1.
This example has general application in that it illustrates that highly
e¤cient sectors in the economy, such as livestock production, can be seriously
handicapped by ine¤ciency elsewhere in the production chain. We cannot
a¡ord to be insular in business today. Getting the industrial relations balance
right in one sector may mean nothing if there is imbalance elsewhere.
5. The waterfront
The cost of getting rural produce across the waterfront is over 4 per cent of
the export price. If we assume that the domestic price for most agricultural
produce is the export price less the cost of exporting (the domestic price
would increase by the same amount as the net export price if the cost of
exporting fell), then we can say that a 25 per cent fall in the cost of shifting
goods across the waterfront would increase the price of rural produce by 1
per cent. In 1995^96 this increase would have added about A$1900 per year
to average broadacre farm incomes: a 27 per cent increase in farm business
pro¢t. Whilst this calculation is crude, it does illustrate how a small
reduction in costs downstream from the farm sector can have profound
e¡ects on farm pro¢tability.
As we will see, the success of waterfront reform depends ultimately on
reform of the labour arrangements in our ports. The creation of new ports,
providing greater competition, may reduce costs for users by competing
away the ine¤ciencies of port authorities and State government tax regimes.
It will mean nothing for the greater problem of labour productivity,






Net present value of beef
Production ö 1995 to 2005
$62m $404m
Beef production ö 1996 8kt cwe 52kt cwe
Beef exports ö 1996 8kt cwe 47kt cwe
Beef sales to Japan 2kt cwe 16kt cwe
Real GDP (gain per year in
1994^95 dollars)
$26m $176m
Source: Centre for International Economics.
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as at present.
Until the passage of the Workplace Relations Act, promulgated earlier
this year, the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) monopoly was assured.
Any new entrant to the stevedoring industry could be served immediately
with a log of claims and thereby `roped-in' to the relevant industrial awards.
The new Act, while falling far short of the New Zealand equivalent, which
precipitated dramatic reform of the waterfront, does at least allow
alternative employment arrangements.
Whereas the previous Act ensured preference in employment for union
members, the Workplace Relations Act outlaws such discrimination. While
there are still serious limitations to the £exibilities able to be achieved by
employers, there is now an opportunity for stevedores to negotiate sub-
stantial productivity improvements if they can withstand the industrial
pressure sure to be directed at them by the MUA.
While the major stevedores acknowledge they could manage their
businesses with 40 per cent of their current labour force, if only the
remainder worked e¤ciently, until early 1998, little or no progress was made
towards that objective. Nonetheless, signi¢cant change in employment
arrangements can still come through new operators utilising the
opportunities created by the Workplace Relations Act.
Furthermore, new operators taking this course of action must source their
labour from outside the existing industry. This is because the culture of the
waterfront to date is such that employees appear to place far greater
importance on loyalty to the MUA than to their employer. Many believe
they owe their jobs to the union, not their employer or port users. While
workers often say `you can't ¢ght the union', there is almost daily evidence
they can ¢ght their employer, and win.
The waterfront industry reform e¡ort of the early part of this decade
provides a classic example of how international benchmarks are the essential
measurement rather than simply relying on a comparison with past domestic
performance. Based on the latter measure, the waterfront reform program
was `a wonderful result': a reduction in the labour force by about 55 per cent,
the same quantum of work done by less than half, by de¢nition productivity
must have doubled!
Sadly, the harsh reality becomes apparent when our domestic performance
is measured against international standards. For example, the reform e¡ort
in New Zealand resulted in stevedoring charges falling, a doubling of cargoes
handled with only 30 per cent of the pre-reform workforce.
3 Not only is
3BIE Benchmarking Study op. cit.
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port, Sydney has a container handling rate equivalent to a Third World port.
The cost of transferring a cargo of newsprint in Sydney from ship to shore
is ten times that of Tauranga, New Zealand, using equivalent equipment.
6. The industrial relations system
The pastoral industry has played a central role in the history of labour
market regulation in Australia. The second case decided by the then newly
created Commonwealth Court of Arbitration and Conciliation in 1906 was a
dispute between the Australian Workers Union and the Pastoralists Federal
Council. The Court's ruling established the Pastoral Industry Award through
which the minimum price of labour has been set for most of the sector ever
since.
Despite having one of Australia's oldest industrial awards (shearing rates
were the second issue considered by the ¢rst Bench of the Arbitration Court
after the waterfront), the Pastoral Industry Award (1907), employers and
employees in agriculture have an older tradition, still maintained today, of
reaching mutually satisfactory arrangements without the involvement of
third parties. Driven principally by necessity borne of isolation and mutual
dependence in scarcely populated regions, commonsense has generally
prevailed over arbitrary rules formed in tribunals far from the workplace,
and the agreements reached have been to their mutual bene¢t in terms of
wages, conditions and job security.
This informal `enterprise bargaining' has occasionally resulted in
prosecutions of both employers and employees when third parties have taken
it upon themselves to enforce aspects of the industrial regulations which run
counter to agreements reached in the workplace. Perhaps the most notorious
example of this is the dispute over the use of wide combs by shearers in the
1970s and 1980s. The Pastoral Industry Award prescribed that shearers could
use shearing combs no wider than 64mm, when it had become common
practice for them to use combs of 85mm or more. After years of disputation
and litigation, the practice adopted by the workers themselves, and accepted
by their employers, came to be accepted by the union and was eventually
legitimised by the Industrial Relations Commission.
The spread and coverage of informal enterprise and workplace bargaining
have always been high in agriculture, as explained above. Nonetheless, the
passage of major amendments to the Act ostensibly designed to facilitate
enterprise agreements notwithstanding, there is a very low incidence of
formal bargaining, as provided for in the Workplace Relations Act and its
predecessors. Where progress has been made in formal bargaining, it has
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produce.
Even among the large employers in the processing sector, take-up has been
low. Only one third of surveyed ¢rms reported having implemented some
enterprise agreement and many such agreements had not been rati¢ed by the
Industrial Commission.
7. Reasons for failure
The processes for formalising enterprise bargaining, and the manner in
which enterprise agreements are interpreted and applied by the Industrial
Relations Commission are the major impediments to increasing scope and
coverage. In order to access Australian Workplace Agreements or certi¢ed
agreements pursuant to the Workplace Relations Act, the employer must
be a constitutional corporation. Since 83 per cent of farm enterprises are
unincorporated, these means of formalising enterprise agreements are closed
to the vast majority, other than in Victoria and the Territories.
Even where these formal agreements are available, the procedural
di¤culties far outweigh the bene¢t. It makes no sense to make formal
applications for enterprise agreements when the period of employment is
often less than the time taken to formalise the agreement.
The incentive for farm employers to enter such agreements is low, given
the success of strategies that have kept award wages relatively low.
Furthermore, rural employers have e¡ectively resisted many of the
conditions that restrict e¤ciency in almost every other industry. For
example, the Pastoral Award does not provide for long service leave,
bereavement leave, carers leave, adoption and parental leave, accident make-
up pay, and redundancy and severance. All these matters are `allowable'
under the so-called award simpli¢cation provisions of the Workplace
Relations Act. Whereas many industries would welcome a reduction in their
awards to these allowable matters, for agriculture the inclusion of these
issues would double the size of the award.
By contrast, for large employers upstream and downstream of the farm
gate, award simpli¢cation and enterprise bargaining do o¡er the oppor-
tunity to improve the e¤ciency of their businesses. As we have seen in the
case of the waterfront, and until recently the meat industry also, unless
there is e¡ective competition between ¢rms there is no incentive for them to
take the risk of industrial action by initiating reform of their labour
arrangements. So long as their competitors face the same limitations and
ine¤ciencies and either the consumer or the suppliers of raw materials are
price takers, the cost of labour ine¤ciency is simply tolerated by the
employer and passed on.
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product markets, such as reductions in tari¡s and vigorous pursuit of
competition policy generally, greatly assist in pushing employers to tackle
reform of their working arrangements. Nonetheless, where there is adequate
competition between ¢rms, structural problems in the labour market,
induced by regulation, remain serious impediments to e¤ciency.
A uniquely Australian institution, the Industrial Relations Commission, has
retarded these e¤ciency gains. While legal technicalities and, until recently,
the compulsory involvement of unions, have discouraged employers from
reforming their workplace arrangements, as the following example shows, even
when the relevant union has agreed with measures which would give greater
responsibility to the individuals directly concerned, the Commission has
declinedtoratifythem.Theprocessisunattractive,butitisalsounpredictable.
An agreement reached between the NFF and the woolclassers association,
a federally registered union representing woolclassers, is a case in point. As
part of a package of award reforms, the parties to the Woolclassers Award
agreed to substantial wage increases and an award provision that sought to
allow individual woolclassers to reach agreement with their employers with
respect to a range of conditions without further reference to the Commission
or the union.
This element of the agreement was rejected by the Commission in the ¢rst
instance, and this rejection was con¢rmed by a senior Full Bench on appeal.
These decisions were arrived at despite uncontradicted evidence that in the
circumstances of the industry, which is characterised by short-term itinerant
employment, formal rati¢cation of arrangements entered into in the work-
place is impossible for practical reasons. Given that the wage increases were
speci¢cally designed to ensure that no disadvantage would be incurred by
employees overall, and the union consented on that basis, the attitude taken
by the Commission was made even more surprising. The reason given was
simply that the Act did not permit the Commission to allow agreements to
be made in the workplace without formal rati¢cation by the Commission,
even if this was to be done pursuant to an award provision.
Eighteen months later, after a change in government but no change to this
part of the Act, the AIRC approved a consent agreement between the
Australian Wool Selling Brokers Employers Federation (AWSBEF) and the
Financial Sector Union (FSUA) to allow all employees paid more than 15
per cent above the award rate to e¡ectively waive all but the minimum
entitlements under the award. The woolclassers' agreement was characterised
as `contracting out' and was rejected by the AIRC on that ground. The
woolbrokers' agreement was rati¢ed without objection.
I could examine the possible reasons for the di¡erent approaches. Some
distinction between the cases could be established, but I believe that any
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the pro¢le of the applicants, and the political climate of the time when the
Commission was approached for rati¢cation. If this is true, it suggests that
the so-called impartial umpire actively seeks to level out the playing ¢eld by
taking into account factors which are not strictly relevant to the interpreta-
tion of the law in a particular case.
In the woolclassers a¡air the relevant union agreed with NFF that there
was no disadvantage from the more £exible arrangements. The AIRC
indicated that whether this was the case or not, `contracting out' was inherently
objectionable to the legislative scheme, the Wage Fixing Principles and
contrary to the public interest, thus the agreement should be struck down.
4
Given the di¤culty experienced by the Commission in interpreting the
provisions of the Act consistently, it is understandable that most
employers ¢nd the provisions of the Act too complex to understand and
apply. Certainly in agriculture, where most employment is seasonal in
nature, the cost of ascertaining and complying with the requirements of
formal agreements makes such a course economically and practically
unfeasible.
These di¤culties are compounded by the attitude taken by some trade
unions, and the ACTU, who have stated publicly that they intend to take
whatever steps are open to them to prevent the approval of non-union
enterprise £exibility agreements. Rather than the Industrial Commission
aiding and abetting this attitude, the Commission ought to take positive
steps to give e¡ect to agreements made between employees and employers
regardless of the views of parties with whom there is no privity of contract.
8. The Workplace Relations Act
The Workplace Relations Act has improved the prospects of labour market
£exibility by:
. introducing new objects which emphasise the need for productivity and
international competitiveness;
4In another, more celebrated case, concerning the Tweed Valley Fruit Processors, the no
disadvantage test again came in for examination by a Full Bench, this time in the context of
an enterprise £exibility agreement rather than in the award stream. The Full Bench faced
again a situation where the parties had consented to an arrangement that traded higher pay
for some basic award conditions. Ultimately, the Bench held that the Commissioner erred
in wrongly assessing that there were no reductions in award entitlements. The Commissioner
was said to have erred in law in misconceiving the no disadvantage test. Paid sick leave
was said to be a community standard and hence its removal quali¢ed as a disadvantage no
matter what the ¢nancial balances may have been.
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minimum rates awards to be made and revised arrangements to ensure that
the exodus from State systems to Federal Awards is brought to an end;
. ensuring freedom of association and the choice to join or not to join
industrial associations, prohibiting preference agreements and closed
shops and discrimination based on union membership;
. reducing union monopolies conferred by the so-called `convenient to
belong to' rule, revising the AIRC's powers to confer such rights to
unions, and replacing award provisions on union right of entry with a
statutory right for unions with members who have invited them into the
workplace;
. revising provisions relating to industrial action to restore secondary
boycott legislation, prohibiting strike pay and limiting protected
industrial action to the negotiation of enterprise agreements, but not
during their operation;
. replacing the unfair dismissal provisions with a system which imposes
some onus on the claimant to prove their claim;
. removing the jurisdiction of the AIRC to review contracts made with
independent contractors;
. abolishing the new Industrial Court, returning a reduced jurisdiction to
the Federal Court.
The Workplace Relations and other Legislation Amendment Bill 1996 seeks
to address many of the obstacles to greater £exibility in formalising enter-
prise bargains referred to above. The Bill incorporates a form of no
disadvantage test: John Howard's guarantee that no worker would be made
worse o¡. It is the dual promise of greater £exibility and `no disadvantage'
that has brought about such a lengthy and complex Bill, the basic scheme of
which is to preserve the award stream, with some simpli¢cation, and allow
employers and employees a range of choices to move out of the award
stream by agreement.
The no disadvantage test in all its forms is a concept that seeks to
guarantee no losers from the process of reform. While meaningful reform is
still possible with such a guarantee, the examples discussed earlier
demonstrate that the method by which the guarantee is delivered is itself an
obstacle to reform.
9. Conclusion
While many of the worst aspects of Australian labour market regulation
have been mitigated within the rural sector, signi¢cant improvements to farm
pro¢tability are achievable by continuing to push for further reform,
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overriding priority must be to give legal e¡ect to agreements reached
between employers and employees. Clearly, this is not the case at present,
although the Workplace Relations Act has substantially improved that
position. Until this is corrected, the incidence of agreements complying with
the provisions of the Act will remain very low.
Without further change, informal enterprise bargains will continue to be
struck at the work place. Where such agreements are contrary to the terms
of the relevant award, both employees and employers remain exposed to
prosecution for such things as working at the weekend (in the shearing
industry) or agreeing on piecework rates without having received sanction of
those rates from the relevant union (the Fruit Growing Award).
The practical implications of the above discussion are as follows:
. in the future the need for employers to win the hearts and mind of their
employees will be greater than ever. If they can achieve this, substantial
productivity gains can be achieved in some industries.
. facilitating greater competition in product markets is an essential
ingredient to achieving e¡ective competition between ¢rms in the manner
in which they engage and manage their workforce;
. another prevailing lesson is that no matter what the legislation may say,
resort to the AIRC should be left to the last. If the AIRC is required to
exercise discretion, the result is likely to be unpredictable. The problem is
not so much the nature of the `no disadvantage test' but rather who
applies it, and how.
. while reform of the Australian labour market has been slow and
haltering, some progress has been made. From the farm sector's point of
view it is essential, and in the national interest, that further progress is
made.
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